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Abstract
It is often claimed that Wheeler insisted on a revision and consequently
shortening of Everett’s PhD thesis, partly because of his anticipation to reconcile
the theory with Bohr’s approach. In this paper, I want to propose a reading
of the historiography that renders Wheeler’s tenacity as admittedly benevolent
but ultimately condemned to failure from the start. To this end I focus on the
time of the genesis of Everett’s thesis, his associated dissatisfaction with the
‘Standard’ and ‘Copenhagen’ formulation of Quantum Mechanics and Wheeler as
the driving force in denying his doctoral student to be part of the debate about
measurement that happened in the second half of the 1950’s. If it hadn’t been
for a lack of knowledge and miscommunication (philosophical failure) we would
presumably find ourselves in a different ‘branch’ of history.
1 Historical Background
This paper tries to clarify that one can’t narrow the events to be discussed that
accompanied the genesis of Everett’s thesis down to overt dissensions. I argue that there
were severe and multi-layered misunderstandings foremost rooted in deep misconceptions
about epistemological considerations. In order to get a clearer picture about how
‘Copenhagen’s’ inconclusive statements that initially preserved its ‘monocracy’ led to
its downfall in the late 1960’s, one might have to consider a) a kind of triangulation,
rather than focusing too much on one side of the coin, and b) a thorough examination
of the reasons for the changes in the attitudes of physicists in the US in the latter half
of the 1960’s. However, this is beyond the scope of this essay.
This section serves as the historical framework in which the narrative of the events
took place. Specifically, I focus on the general attitude towards Quantum Mechanics’
(QM) foundational issues within the United States, providing a fruitful basis for
Everett’s own approach.
Contrary to Europe, discussions about the conceptual foundations of QM were not
remotely as popular in the US, which became the western centre for research in physics
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after the second World War.1 Apart from the differing scope of interest American
physicists, to a large extent, did not worry about metaphysical repercussions of QM,
as is displayed in “the operationalist-pragmatist style philosophy that a good many of
them shared” [1] (cf. [2]). However, the differences in respect to foundational issues
were instrumentally rational, as they were propelled both by the political context of
the Cold War era and the need of the application of QM to a variety of atomic and
subatomic phenomena (cf. [3]). Nevertheless, even before the War, epistemological
considerations hadn’t been paid much attention to in the US. As a matter of fact,
“[a]mong forty-three textbooks on quantum mechanics published between 1928 and 1937,
forty included a treatment of the uncertainty principle; only eight of them mentioned
the complementarity principle” [3]. This reflects the lack of attention that was paid
to Bohr’s epistemological considerations, albeit Wheeler praised them as “the most
revolutionary philosophical conception of our day” [4].2 That the attitude after the
War didn’t change, at least not rapidly, can be detected with Bohm’s Quantum Theory
(1951) being one of the few textbooks that included interpretational discussions about
the theory; although this lack applies elsewhere too. One of the main reasons for
omitting the concept of complementarity from textbooks in particular, and its nearly
complete non-consideration in the US in general, can be said to have been due to
its perception “as an eminently philosophical approach, an especially obscure one
indeed” [5]. Bohr’s doctrine therefore never had the chance to directly influence young
physicists, as it only circulated at conferences or scientific journals. In spite of being
called upon taking on the task of clarifying and spreading his fundamental idea by e.g.
Rosenfeld (1957, in [5]) - one of Bohr’s closest collaborators - who told him that there
is “not a single textbook of quantum mechanics in any language in which the principles
of this fundamental discipline are adequately treated, with proper consideration of the
role of measurement”, Bohr never complied to the suggestion.
In respect to these considerations, it seems kind of doubly paradoxical that up to
the end of the 1940’s the ‘monocracy’ of the Copenhagen view on QM was almost
uncontested. On the one hand, according to Osnaghi et al. (2009), notwithstanding
major differences within the ‘Copenhagen group’, the approach was taken for granted
as Bohr, Heisenberg, Jordan or Pauli shared similar theoretical backgrounds as well as
conceptions about the philosophy of science; e.g. the discreteness of atomic phenomena
or neglecting an isomorphism between the mathematical formalism and physical reality.
To them, the main question posed by QM was an epistemological one (cf. [7]). On the
other hand the ‘Copenhagen’ view was associated with Bohr, mainly because of his
1Freire (2004) describes a “rising interest on foundational problems after World War II, when a
new intellectual and social context emerged among physicists worldwide”. Nonetheless, the so-called
‘monocracy’ of Copenhagen was not fundamentally criticised until shortly after the ‘Einstein-Bohr-
debate’ in 1948.
2This is partly because of the fact that Wheeler held Bohr in high esteem - apart from working
together with him on several occasions, e.g. nuclear fission projects. Wheeler compares Bohr’s
judiciousness “with that of Confucius and Buddha, Jesus and Pericles, Erasmus and Lincoln” [5]
(cf. [6]).
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“intellectual charisma” [5]. However, this description of ‘monocracy’ “does not tell us
how physicists adhered to such a school, nor how they understood complementarity, [its]
conceptual core” [2]. Even among Bohr’s inner circle (e.g. Heisenberg, Pauli, Rosenfeld)
and its most prominent antagonists (Schro¨dinger, Einstein), according to Heilbron
(2001), most physicists merely made use of the formalism to examine the structure of
micro-physics instead of deliberately sticking to or criticising complementarity. In this
sense both the missing clarification of Bohr’s approach and the historical circumstances
explain not only the trend in the US towards pragmatism, but also indicate that the
vagueness of ‘Copenhagen’ may have, counterintuitively, fostered its position as ‘the’
approach to QM.
It was not until the early 1950’s, hugely influenced by the ‘Einstein-Bohr-debate’ in
1948, that the dissidences about foundational issues experienced a revival. While the
first half of the decade was predominantly engaged with the causal interpretation of
Bohm, the latter half was occupied with a surge of research papers on the problem of
measurement in QM. It’s exactly in this second half of the 1950’s that I claim Everett
could have been part of the debate; his ideas have been in theory, so to say, ‘in the
right place at the right time’.3 However, as will be discussed in the following, multiple
intertwined reasons rendered this serious opportunity impossible.
2 Everett on the ‘Standard’ and ‘Copenhagen’ In-
terpretation of QM
“[T]he particular difficulties with quantum mechanics that are discussed in
my paper have mostly to do with the more common (at least in this country)
form of quantum theory, as expressed for example by von Neumann, and not
so much with the Bohr (Copenhagen) interpretation” (Everett to Petersen,
May 1957, in [8]).
That Everett does not distinguish Bohr from ‘Copenhagen’ can be read as reflecting the
common atmosphere among physicists of that time, as explained above. Independently,
in a letter to Jammer (1973, in [9]), Everett states that his “primary influences [while
his ideas took shape] were von Neumann’s book and the later chapters of Bohm’s
Introduction to Quantum Mechanics”. He furthermore reports that his essential ideas
for the theory arose from debates with his fellow graduate student Charles Misner
and Aage Petersen who was spending a year at Princeton and worked as Niels Bohr’s
assistant at the time. Encouraged by Wheeler, he worked those conceptual deliberations
out into his PhD thesis.
The English translation of von Neumann’s Mathematical Foundations was published
in the US in 1955, exactly fitting the time of Everett’s idea-forming process; however,
3Additionally, Princeton was home to many expert figures of QM: von Neumann, Wigner, Einstein
or Bohm (although the latter was forced to leave in 1951).
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Barrett and Byrne (2012) mention that he had presumably already studied the German
original. Both of Everett’s theses (Wave Mechanics Without Probability (1955-56) - the
‘long thesis’ from now on - and On the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (1956-57) -
the ‘short thesis’4 from now on) unequivocally refer to von Neumann’s book. Everett’s
dissatisfaction with the ‘Standard’ view of QM stems mainly from his understanding
of the two dynamics present in the formalism. On the one hand, the unitary and
deterministic time-evolution of the quantum state, represented by the Schro¨dinger-
equation (Process 2); in the case of a continuous change of a system according to
a wave-equation with U as the linear operator: ∂ψ
∂t
= Uψ. On the other hand the
discontinuous and non-linear ‘collapse’ dynamics (Process 1) occurring whenever a
measurement is being performed on a physical system S; induced through observing
a physical quantity with eigenstates φ1, φ2, ..., according to the Born-rule |(ψ, φj)|2
(cf. [10]; cf. [8]). To put it simply: in Everett’s understanding, since the measurement
apparatuses M consist themselves of systems described by the theory as evolving
according to Process 2, the compound of M +S should do so too (cf. [8]). The so-called
‘collapse of the wave-function’ was originally proposed by von Neumann and Dirac in
1932 and represents an additional dynamics to the continuous and linear Schro¨dinger-
dynamics. Based on Process 2 and the associated superposition of states, Process
1 simplified states that whenever a measurement is performed, the observed-system
‘collapses’, ‘jumps’ or ‘reduces’ to one of its possible eigenstates. It’s exactly this - for
Everett - a-causal and ad hoc nature of Process 1 that propelled the formulation of his
thesis (cf. ibid.).
However, “[t]he Bohr interpretation is to me even more unsatisfactory, and on quite
different grounds” [8] (Everett to Petersen, May 1957). His discontent with ‘Copenhagen’
(qua Bohr) mainly stems from the way it handles the concept of measurement. For
Everett, one is not only faced with well-known laws for the classical macro-realm
and inherently unknowable laws for the quantum micro-realm, but, more importantly,
has to deal with a “strange duality of adhering to a ‘reality’ concept for macroscopic
physics and denying the same for the microcosm” (ibid.). For him, this displayed a
“philosophic monstrosity” (Everett to DeWitt, May 1957, in [11]) he wanted to overcome
by omitting Process 1 and exclusively viewing Process 2 as a complete description of
physical reality; entailing the inclusion of the observer as a physical system by itself
into the quantum-mechanical description of reality, rather than having the observer
be the reason for the collapse (“the solipsist position” [8]) and therefore treating it
in a privileged way. What will become more important later on (especially section 4
and 4.1): for Everett, the ‘Copenhagen-observer’ is not necessarily excluded from the
quantum-mechanical description, but rather induces the collapse of the wave function.
Wheeler’s insistence on the revision of the long thesis modified this approach, albeit still
being at least reminiscent of Everett’s own writings. A portrayal of how this alteration
relates to complementarity and thus shaped the debate between Wheeler/Everett and
4The short thesis is most commonly referred to in its published name ‘Relative State’ Formulation
of Quantum Mechanics.
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‘Copenhagen’ is worth a debate on its own but exceeds the scope of this paper. For a
more thorough discussion see for example [8] or [5].5
In order to avoid misunderstandings and overlaps, we should distinguish between
two different approaches: on the one side we find von Neumann-Dirac as the ‘Standard’
view of QM (the more common one in the US and therefore the one Everett was more
familiar with) and on the other hand the ‘Copenhagen’ interpretation (for Everett
represented by Bohr, Heisenberg etc.). While Everett himself states that he has studied
von Neumann and Bohm’s books, we can quite safely say that he wasn’t acquainted
with “Bohr’s epistemological writings” [2]. This entails, briefly, that Everett’s approach
was a) fundamentally based on his understanding of von Neumann-Dirac (‘Standard’
QM) rather than Bohr, or, equivalently, ‘Copenhagen’ and b) that he nevertheless
was not reluctant to criticise ‘Copenhagen’, regardless of his unfamiliarity with its
fundamentals and inherent ambiguities (cf. Everett 1956 in [8]; cf. [5]).
3 Everett’s Approach to QM
Everett depicts his discontent with the ‘Standard’ formulation with two idealised
thought experiments (nowadays known as a ‘Wigner’s friend’ type)6 to argue against the
consistency of the formulation. Even though the ‘experiments’ describe an “extremely
hypothetical” [8] situation and therefore being well-nigh impossible to actually being
performed, Everett’s target is not an actual experimental set-up, but rather a critique
of the conceptual problem of measurement. The ‘gedankenexperiments’ ultimately
end in different alternatives one might give to the consideration of a universe that
is inhabited by more than one observer-system (solipsism reproach). Accordingly,
Everett’s long-thesis proposal is that
“[t]he general validity of pure wave mechanics, without any statistical
assertions, is assumed for all physical systems, including observers and
measuring apparata. Observation processes are to be described completely
by the state function of the composite system which includes the observer
and his object-system, and which at all times obeys the wave equation
(Process 2)” (1955-56 in [8]).
In his project one is able to consider “the state functions themselves as the fundamental
entities” (ibid.) and therefore also the state vector of the entire universe. In simpler,
exaggerated terms: Everett proposes a quantum-mechanical description that treats the
mathematical formalism as deterministic and causal and our subjective experience as
5Everett’s strategy was strikingly similar to assertions made by Schro¨dinger (cf. [12],cf. [13]).
Nevertheless, Schro¨dinger did not give the state vector an epistemic denotation.
6The argument these days known as ‘Wigner’s friend’ only appeared in a paper in 1961. However,
it is not entirely clear whether Wigner was inspired by Everett’s paper, or Everett took up the idea
in discussions with Wigner - as Everett also learned about the two dynamics (Process 1 and 2) in
Wigner’s class (cf. [2]; cf. [5]).
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indeterministic and probabilistic.7 A central assumption for how he is able to infer
experience from the symbolism is therefore his understanding of the ‘state vectors’
themselves: for Everett, they correspond to the physical state of the system (cf. [8]).
It’s exactly in this sense that he regards von Neumann’s depiction of the observation-
interaction as “involving a physical process” [5] signifying “an isomorphism (or at
least a homomorphism)” (Everett to DeWitt 1957, [11]) between the mathematics
and physical experience.8 However, it is important to understand that an isomorphic
relationship is not necessarily a ‘one-to-one’ correspondence, but, as Everett explains
in a footnote, rather represents a homomorphism in our present day understanding:
any theory is denoted as a logical construct, “consisting of symbols and rules for their
manipulation, some of whose elements are associated with elements of the perceived
world” (ibid.). In this regard, it is easy to see that Everett’s understanding of physical
knowledge is both not rooted in and distinctively different from ‘Copenhagen’ (Bohr).9
4 The Root(s) of Misunderstanding
In this section I try to show that the possible core of the futile endeavour to
reconcile the un-reconcilable cannot be simply pinpointed as the misjudgement of a
single person. To prevent possible misunderstandings regarding my proposal: it’s not
about recriminations or allegations against Wheeler, but rather about the following
two intertwined assumptions. Without an involvement of the ‘Copenhagen group’ and
a more thorough understanding of the ideas of his pupil, Everett could have been
part of the debate in the late 1950’s and his ideas the core of a possible alternative
development and therefore course of history.
That Wheeler did not (or did not want to) understand Everett’s own approach
to a far-reaching extent is apparent when considering his correspondence with the
‘Copenhagen group’ about his student’s thesis.10
For Everett, it’s not the experimental conditions that set the framework for the
interpretation of a mathematical formalism, but the theory and its symbols themselves.
This axiomatic handling of a physical theory “may very well have been totally in-
strumental” (Everett and Misner 1977, in [15]) in the genesis of Everett’s thesis and
mirrors Wheeler’s attitude towards theoretical physics, as Misner expressed during the
7Everett’s concern about probability can also be detected with the titles of his manuscripts or
theses dedicated towards QM and written between 1955-56: three out of four papers explicitly state
the term in the title. All of them extensively treat its connotation.
8It should be called into attention that, depending on one’s reading of von Neumann’s projection
postulate, the understanding of the state vector changes. Everett’s interpretation of the postulate was
meticulously faulted by e.g. [14].
9Despite my focus on a basic difference and its consequences, one could also point towards similarities
or connections between Bohr’s and Everett’s approach; e.g. their attached importance to the concept
of correlations or relativity (cf. [5], cf. [8]).
10I will not commit to Wheeler’s terminological critique of e.g. ‘splitting’ or ‘branching’. As in the
exemplary case of a splitting amoeba, it is not entirely clear how exactly Everett meant the example
to be understood.
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recorded conversation with Everett: namely the “idea that you ought to just look at the
equations and obey the fundamentals of physics while you follow their conclusions and
give them a serious hearing” (ibid.). It’s exactly this basic understanding of the nature
of physical knowledge that I read as both a lack of engagement with epistemological
essentials of the respective discussion partners, as well as the pivotal misunderstanding;
without its surmounting, or at least recognition, there were no means of reconciliation.
I want to claim that this fundamental difference can be regarded as the main reason for
Wheeler’s endeavour being lead astray and Everett being deprived of the opportunity
of a remarkable career in physics.
In contrast to Wheeler (or Everett, for that matter), for Bohr, mathematical
symbols in physical theories are, in principle, only endowed with denotation insofar as
they correlate to experimental set-ups; for him the entire mathematics is firstly only
but a “tool for deriving predictions, of definite or statistical character [and secondly]
not susceptible to pictorial interpretation” [16]. Or, equivalently, as Stern’s example
about schizophrenia intends to show: “physical theories establish correlations between
facts of our experience, the ‘definition’ of which does not involve the mathematical
constructs of those very theories” (Stern to Wheeler 1956, in [5]). Notwithstanding, as
I indicated in section 1, it should also not be overlooked that ‘Copenhagen’s’ argument
had various layers, that were, at least during the 1950’s, not explicitly discerned - e.g.
the importance of language or nature of physical knowledge; one could even speak
of a mere “collection of generic statements” [5]. Replying to indistinct statements
from Copenhagen (concerning Everett’s view on Process 2) Wheeler wrote: “if it
is a theological statement to postulate the “universal wave function” it is also a
theological statement to refuse to entertain the postulate” (Wheeler to Stern 1956,
in [17]; cf. [2]). One can read this exemplary utterance as an indication for Wheeler
merely understanding that Bohr refuses Everett’s basic assumption, but not why.
Regarding the generic, even ad hoc criticism of ‘Copenhagen’ it could very likely be
that both the correspondence and Wheeler’s visit in Copenhagen in 1956 failed to reach
basilar epistemological considerations. I think it is remarkable that up to the 1950’s, the
influence of Bohr was so great that a doctoral dissertation of an American University
had to obtain the ‘blessing’ of ‘Copenhagen’ before being assessed at Princeton. Even
more puzzling is the fact that Jammer, while researching for his book [18], described
Everett’s deliberations as “one of the best kept secrets in this century”. Implying not
only that Everett’s thesis did “virtually [...] not have a first life in the 1950s” [2], but
also that the correspondence with ‘Copenhagen’ had been unknown until the 1970’s.
Wheeler’s lack of understanding regarding Bohr’s doctrine therefore is not a clear-
cut affair. For reasons of limited space, I cannot go into too much detail about the
miscommunications but would like to point to [18], [5] and [8] for an extensive account
of this multi-layered matter.
Nevertheless, the missing clarification is even more so applicable to their critics, e.g.
Everett. The above mentioned ‘reliance on the outset’ makes a deduction of classical
from quantum physics impossible for him, hence the necessity of an experimental
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framework is understood as a ‘strange duality’ implying “that macrosystems are
relatively immune to quantum effects” (Everett to Petersen 1957; cf. [19]). The existence
of misapprehensions on Everett’s side unfortunately is not surprising, recalling the
pragmatist attitude in the US. In the tape recording of him and Misner, the latter
remarked that they, in contrast to the people who learned about QM ever since its ‘natal
hour’, were not remotely as profoundly shattered by its philosophical implications, for
in “every new course in physics you get some new kind of nonsense which seems to make
sense a little bit later, so quantum mechanics is no worse than electromagnetic fields, or
F = ma” (Everett and Misner 1977, cf. [15]). His indifference towards interpretational
matters can also be detected in a letter exchange with Jammer in 1973: while the
latter asked Everett whether he ever studied philosophy or psychology, Everett replied
that “the only formal course [he] had was an introduction to epistemology” [9] at
his undergraduate institution, the Catholic University of America (cf. [20]). There
simply was no serious effort on Everett’s part to “to reach a deeper understanding of
the philosophical background of complementarity” [5] in particular, or epistemological
considerations in general. However, I read this circumstance as an advantage, namely
that he, based on his unconcernedness, most likely wouldn’t even have considered
involving ‘Copenhagen’ into the thesis-process. Why would he? His plan was to provide
a dissociation from it - already implied by the title Wave Mechanics Without Probability
- for which he wouldn’t need the ‘blessing’ of Bohr. This stands in stark contrast to
what Wheeler had in mind, as will be clarified in the next section.11
4.1 Wheeler and Everett - Short and Long Thesis
Regardless of the misunderstandings and ambiguities surrounding the ‘Copenhagen’
approach, I want to argue that if Wheeler would have taken seriously the concerns
of his pupil, he might not have tried to find a common ground for Everett and Bohr.
That he only agreed on supervising Everett because of his hope to reconcile QM with
General Relativity (GR) is at most secondary;12 what can be stated quite safely by
contrast is his receptiveness towards new and far reaching ideas, e.g. him supervising
Feynman’s doctoral dissertation that introduced the path-integral formulation of QM
(cf. [21]).
Wheeler might have had admirable intentions for Everett, nevertheless, his plans on
how to go about handling the thesis of his PhD student were everything but restrained:
he planned on publishing the dissertation at the ‘Danish Academy of Science’ in full
length in order to legitimate it in Europe, as he had the feeling that the “original work
[of his student] is destined to become widely known, and it ought to have the bugs
ironed out of it before it is published rather than after” (Wheeler to Everett 1956, in [8],
cf. [2]. That he probably did not entirely see through Everett’s approach (the ‘bugs’
11It can be quite safely assumed that the idea of involving Bohr originated from Wheeler. However,
according to Osnaghi et al. (2009), one nevertheless cannot be entirely certain of it.
12“Princeton was in the small minority of places in the US at which physicists were interested in
general relativity and cosmology” [5]
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he wanted ‘ironed out’) is most evident when contrasting his concerns (universalising
‘Copenhagen’) with those of his pupil (overcoming its shortcomings).
Not caused, but likely fostered by both the difference in attitude between Bohr
and Everett/Wheeler, and the correspondence between Wheeler and the ‘Copenhagen
group’, Everett’s thesis was not only shortened by a significant amount, but basically
obliterated.
While Everett in his long thesis (1955-56) criticised Bohr qua ‘Copenhagen’ (section
2), in his short thesis (1957) he referred to Bohr qua “‘external observation’ formulation”
[22] and by association expressed the concern of reconciling QM with GR. One result of
the thesis’ revision evidently was postulating the inevitability of leaving the observer-
system out of the mathematical expression on measurement interactions; thereby
substituting Everett’s own view of QM “presuppos[ing] the classical level and the
correctness of classical concepts in describing this level” [8]. This surrogation can
be interpreted as the hand writing of Wheeler, as Everett himself didn’t bring up
such criticism even in correspondence after the paper was written (cf. Everett to
Petersen 1957, [19]). Bohr on the other hand, albeit frequently underlining deliberations
regarding the necessity of classicality, never made such claims: “it is of course possible
to include any intermediate auxiliary agency employed in the measuring process [into
the quantum-mechanical description]” [23].
It is puzzling that Wheeler either did not realise Everett’s deep dissatisfaction with
‘Copenhagen’ or simply circumvented it in order to not “offend his hero Bohr” [24]. After
his visit to Copenhagen and a letter from Stern (1956), Wheeler ’s reply to criticism of
the ‘Copenhagen group’ against Everett’s long thesis teems with misunderstandings of
his student’s ambitions: he asserts that
“this very fine and able and independently thinking young man has gradually
come to accept the present approach to the measurement problem as correct
an self consistent, despite a few traces that remain in the present thesis,
draft of a past dubious attitude” ( [17], emphasis added).
It is remarkable that there is no track of such a shift in attitude in Everett’s own
writings. Regarding the remarks above (section 2 and 3), he even thought that the
‘Copenhagen’ approach to measurement, based on his understanding, was ‘even more
unsatisfactory’ than the ‘Standard’ von Neumann account. That Everett tried to
undermine instead of generalise ‘Copenhagen’ is contrasted by Wheelers assurance that
the dissertation “is not meant to question the present approach to measurement, but
to accept and generalize it” (ibid.). This could be an indication that, for him, the
question was not so much about the nature of physical knowledge itself, but rather a
mere semantic difference between his ‘hero’ and pupil. The missing perception of this
deep philosophical chasm between the un-reconcilable ultimately lead the situation
into an impasse, which was eventually escaped by revisiting the long thesis in such a
way that it would almost completely bury Everett’s own approach by shifting the focus
from an undermining to a generalisation.
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While the long thesis displays Everett’s concerns (particularly von Neumann’s
formulation), the short thesis reflects Wheeler’s concerns about the ‘external obser-
vation formulation’ for the purpose of harmonising fundamentally different - sensu
epistemological - approaches. Unlike the long version, the short thesis left out claims
about the shortcomings of ‘Copenhagen’ and focused on the realm of its area of validity.
Everett’s ideas were rendered from a serious critique to a mere objectified modification
of the ‘Copenhagen’ interpretation. Wheeler “sat down with Everett and told him
precisely what to omit from the manuscript of 1956” [24]. Additionally, the thesis was
published with an attached assessment by Wheeler (cf. [25]). In order to make the
thesis more easily digestible to Bohr, the revision of the dissertation not only shortened
its length by a considerable amount - from around 96 to 23 pages - but also took away
the last possibility for Everett to be part of the debate about measurement in the
second half of the 1950’s. “In comparison with the 1956 paper [. . . ] it is practically
new text” [24].
Without a discussion, and, more importantly, a perception of the essential diver-
gences in the first place, there was no possibility to find a common ground between
Wheeler’s highly praised student and the so-called ‘father-figure’ of QM. Summarising,
Wheeler’s understanding of Everett’s ideas combined with his lack of comprehension
of Bohr’s doctrine led to an undermining of his student’s proposal and eventually to
the shortened thesis Everett ultimately defended. These misunderstandings could have
been prevented with a more thorough examination on either side; notwithstanding my
picturing of Wheeler as the intermediary, or, equivalently, stimulating factor.
5 Conclusion and Different History
In sum, I delineate three main reasons for Everett not taking part in the mea-
surement debate in the second half of the 1950’s: a) inherent ambiguities within
‘Copenhagen’ itself, associated with mere ‘generic statements’ rather than explicit
references towards measurement; b) as a consequence thereof, Wheeler’s misunder-
standing of ‘Copenhagen’s or, equivalently, Bohr’s epistemological foundations and,
most importantly, c) Wheeler’s lack of understanding of Everett’s own approach that
eventually lead to an involvement of ‘Copenhagen’ and ultimately to the undermining
of Everett’s ideas. It has to be put into the realm of speculation however, whether
Wheeler, had he understood Everett’s severe dissatisfaction with how ‘Copenhagen’
dealt with the problem of measurement, would have proposed to supervise Everett
in the first place. By the same token, the possibility for Everett to further pursue a
career in academia, as he, even before starting his PhD, had immense interest in game
theory and military matters has to remain speculation. Nevertheless, what I think is
safe to say is that we would be faced with a quite different theory of ‘Many-Worlds’
and therefore historiographical description, had Everett not “washed [his] hands of the
whole affair in 1956” (Everett to Le´vy-Leblond 1977, in [8]).
Summarising the essay’s central implication: while Everett aimed for an explicit
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critique of - and therefore suggested a real alternative to - the ‘Standard’ and ‘Copen-
hagen’ interpretation of QM, Wheeler’s insistence on revision resulted in a generalising
of and hence a formulation of the thesis that suggested a more universally applica-
ble ‘Copenhagen’. The reworking of the dissertation ultimately reduced the original
approach to a mere alteration, rather than using its existing capacity to propose an
apt rival to the ‘Copenhagen’ or ‘von Neumann’ formulation - like e.g. Bohm’s causal
interpretation was. In lieu of Wigner being the responsible character for bringing the
“Princeton school” [26] into being in the late 1960’s, Everett could have been the one
to pose a contradistinction from ‘Copenhagen’ already in the second half of the 1950’s.
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